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As part of its research, the Mineral Trade and Markets Project is exa- 
mining trends in the major metal industries since 1950. As now 
envisaged, this study will contain four substantive chapters. .The first, a 
draft of which is available as an IIASA working paper (WP-83-91), reviews 
changes in the location of metal mining and identifies the important 
determinants responsible for these changes. The second chapter 
focusses in a similar manner on geographic shifts in metal consumption. 
while the third investigates trends in the location of processing. The 
fourth examines the role of transportation costs, political blocs, interna- 
tional ownership ties, and other factors that influence the choice of trad- 
ing partners and introduce rigidities into international trade flows. 
This working paper is a preliminary version of the third chapter con- 
cerned with the location of processing. It will be revised before publica- 
tion, and is being circulated a t  this time to elicit comments, criticisms, 
and suggestions for improvement. 
John E. Tilton 
Research Leader 
Mineral Trade and Markets Project 
A popular perception has arisen that the mineral production of 
developing countries is too often exported in unprocessed form, thereby 
depriving the host country of the value-added and benefiting the 
developed country importer. The validity of this allegation and possible 
explanations for the location of minerals processing is the subject of this 
working paper. An examination of the patterns and trends in the loca- 
tion of processing for aluminum, copper, iron, nickel, tin and zinc, up to 
the refined metal stage, reveals that developing countries are processing 
a larger proportion of their mine output today than 30 years ago. 
Despite significant progress, the developing countries as a group are pro- 
cessing less than 50 percent of their ore production, with the exception 
of tin and copper. When the major ore producers from all country groups 
are considered, the data reveal that only two commodities, tin and 
alumina, exhibit a trend toward greater domestic processing. Thus, the 
pattern of exporting minerals in unprocessed form is not confined to 
developing countries, but is exhibited by a number of developed coun- 
tries, particularly Canada and Australia. 
To explain this pattern of behavior the chapter offers three plausible 
explanations. The first contends that economic factors, such as com- 
parative costs, are responsible for the location of processing. The second 
explanation attributes the location to primarily political factors, such as 
tariff barriers or government subsidies. The third explanation, though 
not entirely independent of the other two, emphasizes the dynamic 
nature of the location of processing by accounting for the effect of the 
historical legacy. 
The analysis demonstrates that  comparative advantage a t  one stage 
of processing does not guarantee comparative advantage at subsequent 
stages. Proximity to ore production is not necessarily more advanta- 
geous than locations with an abundant supply of complementary inputs, 
such as energy, or proximity to markets. Declining transportation costs 
have reduced the  diseconomies of processing at greater distances from 
the mine. Other economic considerations, as well as the impact of public 
policy and the historical legacy differ by commodity and over time. 
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THE LOCATION OF WNERAIS PROCESSING 
Ruthann C. Moomy 
INTRODUCTION 
Minerals processing occurs in a variety of locations. ranging from 
those close to the mine site to those with proximity to commercial 
centers and including some third party countries that are neither major 
producers nor major consumers but appear to possess a comparative 
advantage of another type. A popular perception has arisen that  develop- 
ing countries in particular do not process an optimal share of their ore 
production prior to  export. This situation has warranted international 
attention. The strategy of downstream processing of developing country 
exports of primary commodities has been the subject of such global reso- 
lutions as the U.N. General Assembly's Program of Action on the Estab- 
lishment of a New International Economic Order, the Lima Declaration of 
UNIDOes Second General Conference, and the  International Development 
Strategy of UNCTAD. (Wall, 1979). 
Downstream processing can provide significant benefits. The value 
added by processing contributes to the country's export earnings and to 
government revenues. The processing industry provides employment 
opportunities. Further domestic processing may enhance the country's 
control over the minerals sector of the economy and thereby permit the 
country to reap greater economic and social benefits from the minerals 
sector. In another light, minerals processing is not viewed as an end in 
itself; rather, i t  is desirable for its contribution to further economic 
development and diversification. This line of reasoning maintains tha t  
local industries should arise to supply the processing industry with 
required inputs or to use the output to make finished products. 
Economic nationalism provides still another justification for domestic 
processing and is reflected in the idea tha t  mineral exporting developing 
countries should be more than the "hewers of wood and the  drawers of 
water" for the developed capitalist economies (Balogh, 1978). This con- 
cern is not strictly limited to developing countries but is also expressed 
to a degree by Canada, itself a major exporter of minerals in both pro- 
cessed and unprocessed form. The non-renewable nature of minerals 
contributes to economic nationalism, engendering the  attitude that  
mineral resources must be used to  foster domestic development or con- 
served for future generations, rather than exploited for the beneFit of 
consumers in a foreign country. 
Interest in processing is not limited to ore producing countries. 
Those countries whose processing industries are dependent on imported 
raw materials, seek a dependable supply of quality inputs a t  a reasonable 
price while maintaining some flexibility to react to changing economic 
circumstances. The final consumer is primarily concerned with obtain- 
ing the product at lowest possible costs, and indirectly with the impact of 
the location of processing on that  objective. 
Finally, questions concerning the location of processing are impor- 
tant for the larger study, of which this chapter is a part, because it 
determines the stage of production a t  which trade occurs. For our pur- 
poses, the scope is limited to the treatment of ores up to the  refined 
metal stage. 
The next section presents data on the portion of ores that are pro- 
cessed domestically. The data help to  answer the question: what pro- 
gress have developing country mineral exporters made in acquiring 
downstream processing, over time and for which metals. Their progress 
is compared with that  of developed country mineral exporters, such as 
Canada and Australia. The chapter then examines the major factors 
influencing the location of processing. Three explanations for the 
observed behavior are described. The first contends that  economic fac- 
tors, such as comparative costs, are primarily responsible for the loca- 
tion of processing. The second explanation attributes the location to pri- 
marily political factors, such as tariff barriers or government subsidies. 
The third explanation, though not entirely independent of the other two, 
emphasizes the dynamic nature of the location of processing. For exam- 
ple, historically a lag appears between development of mine output and 
smelting capacity. during which time ores are exported. Upon mine 
exhaustion, existing processing capacity is still usable and relies upon 
imported ores from a new mining area. The final section of the chapter 
evaluates each explanation in light of the evidence and draws conclu- 
sions about the determinants of the location of processing. 
PATERNS AND TRENDS IN MINEFWS PROCESSING 
Table 1 presents the amount of ore processed by developing coun- 
tries as a group, as a percent of the ore mined by developing countries. 
The table shows that developing countries are processing a larger pro- 
portion of their mine output today than 30 years ago, with the single 
exception of blister copper. Nevertheless, the developing countries still 
process a relatively low percent of their ore production, less than half, 
with the exception of tin and copper. Similar tables for the developed 
countries and socialist countries would show ratios consistently in 
excess of one for the developed countries, and almost as consistently 
equal to one for the socialist countries. Table 2 presents the percentage 
of ore processed in the country in which i t  is mined, including all major 
producers from all country groups. Only two commodities, alumina and 
tin, exhibit a trend toward greater domestic processing. A comparison of 
Table 2 with Table 1 indicates the degree of success that developing 
countries have experienced relative to ore producing countries in gen- 
eral, in processing greater amounts of their mineral output. The pattern 
varies significantly by commodity, and for each commodity a look behind 
the  aggregate data merits attention. Appendix tables 1 through €3 pro- 
vide production data by commodity, by country, for selected years from 
1950 through 1980. 
Table Lore Processed by Developing Countries as a Percent of Ore Mined 
by Developing Countries 
Cqmmodity 1950 1960 1970 1980 
Aluminaa 
Aluminuma 
Blister Copper, 
Refined Copper 
Pig Irog 
Nickel 
Primary Tin 
Refined Zinc 
Table 2.0re Processed by Major Ore Producing countriese as a Percent of 
Ore Mined 
Commodity 1950 1960 1970 1980 
Aluminaa 
Aluminupla 
Blister Coppet 
Refined Copper 
Pig Irog 
Nickel 
Primary Tin 
Refined Zinc 
Notes: 
30 account for the non-metallurgical uses of bauxite, bauxite pro- 
duction was reduced by ten percent before the ratio of alumina produc- 
tion to bauxite production was calculated. To account for the  non- 
metallurgical uses of alumina, bauxite production was reduced by an ad- 
ditional five percent before the ratio of aluminum production to bauxite 
production was calculated. 
'NA indicates data are  not available. 
'includes ferroalloys. 
dlncludea primary nickel and nickel contained in ferronickel, nickel 
oxide sin ter and copper-nickel alloys smelted directly from ores. 
' ~ a j o r  ore producing countries represent all countries with mine 
output equal to, or greater than, one percent of world production. 
Source: Appendix Tables 1 through 8; Tilton (1983) Comparative Ad- 
vantage in Mining. Appendix Tables la-f. IIASA Working Paper No. WP-83 
ALuminum. The transformation of bauxite into aluminum metal 
involves two stages. In the first stage bauxite is refined into aluminum 
oxide, commonly called alumina. In the second stage smelting of the 
alumina removes the oxygen and produces aluminum metal. Developing 
country bauxite producers have been much more successful in acquiring 
alumina processing capacity than aluminum smelters. Data for alumina 
production in 1950 are not available, reflecting the lack of an established 
market for alumina at that  time. In 1955, six percent of their bauxite 
was processed into alumina domestically; the corresponding number for 
1900 is 39 percent. Between 1970 and 1900 almost all major bauxite pro- 
ducers, with the notable exception of Guinea, increased their share of 
alumina processing. Surinam now refines 70 percent of its bauxite and 
Jamaica 40 percent. Australia had refined 50 percent in 1970 and 
increased the share to 60 percent by 1900. For aluminum smelting, not 
only do developing countries process a much smaller share of their 
alumina into aluminum, but the aluminum smelting that does occur 
does not take place in the countries that  are the largest bauxite produc- 
ers. For example, Guinea and Jamaica produce no aluminum; and Suri- 
nam processed only six percent of its bauxite into aluminum in 1900. 
The developing countries with aluminum smelters are those with the 
larger domestic markets, such as Brazil and India. In addition, 
Venezuela and more recently Bahrain, have established aluminum smelt- 
ing capacity, in spite of the fact that  they have no bauxite production 
and consume only a small percent of their aluminum output. 
The pattern exhibited by the developing countries is also represen- 
tative of the developed countries. Australia, the world's largest bauxite 
producer, processes only five percent of its bauxite into aluminum. 
Greece, the second largest bauxite producer among the developed coun- 
tries, processes 20 percent of its bauxite into aluminum. Only 20 percent 
of the aluminum produced in 1980 was smelted in the same country in 
which the bauxite was mined, down from 35 percent in 1950. Aluminum 
smelting is more likely to occur in countries with large domestic mark- 
ets, such as the U.S., Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. Two 
significant exceptions are Canada and Norway who smelt most of their 
aluminum for export. 
For the socialist countries data limitations permit only a few obser- 
vations. Between 1950 and 1980 the socialist countries have developed 
the capacity to process quantities of alumina and aluminum in excess of 
their bauxite production. Over the past two decades Hungary has 
increased its share of alumina processing from 50 percent to nearly 80 
percent of its bauxite production. Despite rapid growth in both bauxite 
and alumina production, Hungary's aluminum production has remained 
fairly limited. This situation reflects the Hungarian-Soviet Alumina- 
Aluminum Treaty of 1962, whereby smelting capacity for Hungarian 
alumina was established in the  U.S.S. R. to exploit surplus hydroelectric 
power there. As a result, the U.S.S.R. increased its smelter capacity a t  a 
faster rate than its ore production. 
Copper. The transformation of copper ore to refined copper metal 
requires the concentration of the ore (20-40 percent Cu), the smelting OF 
the concentrate to produce blister copper (96-99 percent Cu), and then 
the refining of the blister to produce copper more than 99.9 percent 
pure. An international market exists for each of the products: concen- 
trates, blister and refined copper. Developing countries have throughout 
the period smelted most of their concentrates domestically; however, 
since 1960 a downward trend has developed. In 1980 only 78 percent of 
copper ore produced in developing countries was smelted, compared to 
90 percent in 1960. While it is true that some traditional producers, 
specifically Chile and Zaire, are smelting a slightly smaller portion of 
their mine output, the primary cause for the downward trend lies with 
the relatively new mining areas opened up in the Philippines, Papua New 
Guinea, and Mexico. The Philippines completed the construction of their 
first smelter-refinery complex in 1983. 
The developing countries exhibit a general upward trend in percen- 
tage of ores processed to the refined copper stage. Zambia now refines 
100 percent of its ore production. Peru has made substantial gains in 
refining its ore domestically, from 16 percent in 1960 to 63 percent in 
1980. Chile exhibits a similar, though less dramatic, trend from 42 per- 
cent in 1960 to 76 percent in 1980. Of the  major developing country pro- 
ducers only Zaire processes a lower percentage today than formerly. 
Zaire's refining capacity has remained almost unchanged since 1960. 
while its mine output grew by over 50 percent. South Korea and Taiwan 
have recently developed processing industries. While their capacity is 
not large compared to the developed countries, it is an indication that 
developing countries without domestic ore production have acquired pro- 
cessing capability. 
For developed countries the general trend has been to maintain 
smelting capacity in excess of the amount required to process domestic 
ores. Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany maintain a large 
smelting capacity despite the lack of a substantial domestic copper min- 
ing industry. In 1950 and 1960. the U.S. smelted more ore than it mined; 
but for the two later years of the study, the U.S. smelted slightly less 
than i t  mined. Canadian smelter output as a percentage of mine output 
fell significantly from 90 percent in 1960 to 66 percent in 1980, due pri- 
marily to the opening up of new mines in British Columbia, far from 
existing processing facilities. 
In developed countries refining capacity is large relative. to ore pro- 
duction, in part because they produce a substantial amount of refined 
copper from old scrap. In 1980, the U.S. produced 1,686 thousand tons of 
refined copper, of which 28 percent was produced From scrap. Neverthe- 
less, the U.S. refined less copper in 1980 than in 1970. Belgium main- 
tains the world's seventh largest refinery capacity, relying primarily on 
imports. 
The socialist countries smelt all their copper ores, almost 
exclusively within the country of origin. Refined copper output exceeds 
smelter output in the U.S.S.R. by approximately 25%, which probably 
reflects the role of scrap and not the effect of imports. Poland, the 
second largest copper ore producer among the socialist countries, 
smelts and refines virtually all its ore domestically. China refined 
almost twice as much copper as it smelted in 1980. 
Iron. Data for pig iron production are used to identify where iron ore 
is processed. Unfortunately the data do not account for iron ore that is 
treated by the direct reduction method of ironmaking. While the magni- 
tude of direct reduction is still not large, it  is relatively more important 
for developing countries. Hence, a slight underestimation of the quan- 
tity that developing countries process results. 
In 1950 the developing countries were not large iron ore producers, 
accounting for less than 10 percent of world output. In 1955 and 1960 
they processed about 20% of their iron ore into pig iron, attributable 
largely to India and Brazil. Between 1960 and 1970 their iron ore produc- 
tion more than doubled, and the percentage smelted locally fell. By 
1980, 31 percent of their ore was being processed in developing coun- 
tries. Mexico had joined the ranks of significant developing country pro- 
ducers. 
The early pattern of iron production consisted of the United States 
and the larger, developed countries of Europe as the major producers, 
relying primarily on domestic ore and ore imports from Sweden. Mining, 
processing and consuming took place within one country or in close geo- 
graphic proximity. By 1960 Canada and Venezuela had become impor- 
tant ore suppliers for the U.S. From the largest iron producer in 1960, 
the US. fell to third place by 1980 and actually produced less iron in 
1980 than it had a decade earlier. By 1980 Japan had become the second 
largest iron producer, behind the U.S.S.R. Japan relies entirely on 
imports for its supply of iron ore. Australia is a major supplier for the 
Japanese industry. Australia processed only 13 percent of its iron ore in 
1980. Canada, Sweden and South Africa also produce much more iron ore 
than their domestic iron industry consumes. Less than half the iron ore 
mined in 1980 was processed into pig iron domestically, and this t rend 
over the last 30 years has been downward. 
The Soviet Union processes about 80 to 90 percent of i ts  iron ore 
domestically, while Poland and Romania maintain an iron industry 
without significant domestic iron ore production. The result is a balance 
between ore production and pig iron output for the socialist countries as 
a whole. 
Nickel.  Nickel processing results in a variety of commercial pro- 
ducts. For our purposes, in addition to primary refined nickel, the  data 
include the nickel content of ferronickel, nickel oxide sinter and 
copper-nickel alloys smelted directly from ores. These intermediate, 
processed products are used directly by the steel industry. Between 
1950 and 1960 New Caledonia was the only developing country to process 
any nickel. From 1970 onwards Cuba processed half its mine output. 
During the 1970s the  Philippines and the Dominican Republic became ore 
producers and simultaneously built processing capacity. As a whole, the 
developing countries processed 44 percent of their ore in 1980. 
While the developed country nickel ore producers do process a 
larger share of their o re  than the developing countries. a significant 
amount is processed in developed countries without nickel mines. In 
fact, nickel processing is less concentrated than nickel mining. For 
example, in 1980 Australia processed only half of its output; and over the 
period Canada has processed between 60 and 80 percent. Among the 
ranks of the important processing countries that  lack nickel mines are 
the US., the U.K., and Norway in the early years. joined later by France, 
and then more recently joined and overtaken by Japan. 
Over the  latter half of the period covered by the study, the socialist 
countries began to process more than they mined, due primarily to  the 
U.S.S.R. However, if Cuba is included with the socialist countries a bal- 
ance between mine output and processed output results because the 
U.S.S.R processes the  ore that  Cuba does not process domestically. 
%. The role of developing countries in tin refining presents a 
dramatic contrast to the  other metals under study. Malaysia is the larg- 
est processor over the entire period. In addition to refining all its 
domestic ore production, Malaysia also processed imported ore over the 
entire period. By 1970 Thailand and Nigeria were also processing 100 
percent of their ore. Indonesia built a smelter in 1967 and by 1980 was 
processing almost all i ts  ores domestically. Bolivia has embarked on a 
policy of more domestic processing and was able to smelt 50 percent of 
its ore by 1980. The developing countries as a group smelted 94 percent 
of their ore output in 1980. 
The role of developed countries in tin processing has been one of 
continual decline since 1950. The only developed country with signifi- 
cant  ore production, Australia, processes only half of its ore. The U.S., 
the U.K., the Netherlands and Belgium were the four largest processors 
in 1950 after Malaysia. From a position in 1950 of producing over 50 per- 
cent  of the world's refined tin, these four developed countries' share of 
output fell to 6 percent by 1980. 
Zinc. The developed countries dominate the zinc smelting industry 
just as they do the  zinc mining industry. Nevertheless the  developing 
countries managed to process almost 50 percent of their ore in 1980. 
Mexico's processing industry now treats  60 percent of the domestic ores. 
While Peru's mine output has grown over the  past decade, its smelter 
capacity has remained static. Although small relative to  world output, 
both Brazil and the Republic of Korea have smelting industries that are 
more than sufficient to treat  domestic ores. 
Among the developed countries processing capacity is widespread. 
Canada processes about half its output, and Australia processes a slightly 
higher percentage. The only developed country zinc ore producers 
without smelters are the Irish Republic and Sweden. Enough concen- 
t ra te  exports are available to support processing in just about every 
other European country. Japan smelts about three times the amount 
that  it mines. The U.S. zinc smelting industry has been on the decline, 
following the trend of ore production. In 1980 U.S. zinc metal output was 
only 40 percent of what it was in 1970. 
The review of trends in processing raises a series of questions, such 
as: why do even developed country ore producers, such as Canada and 
Australia, often export large amounts of metal in concentrate form; what 
is responsible for the downward t rend in the proportion of copper 
smelted by developing countries; what is the cause for the decline in the 
position of the U.S. processing industry; is proximity to markets more 
important for some metals than for others. Having established where 
processing takes place, it is now appropriate to investigate why. The 
next section examines the theories tha t  attempt to explain this 
behavior. 
DETEXMDJANTS OF THE LOCATION OF PROCESSING 
This section presents a brief theoretical discussion of the deter- 
minants of the location of processing. The determinants fall into three 
categories: those that  are economic in nature, those that are political, 
and those that  are the result of the historical legacy of past activity. As 
each category is described in turn, some interrelationships will become 
apparent. 
Economic Determinants 
The economic objective behind the choice of location for processing 
is to minimize costs. Factors influencing costs include input availabil- 
ity, economies of scale, transportation costs and marketing costs. 
Input availability a t  a competitive price is a necessary prerequisite 
for processing. This argument follows the line of reasoning of the factor 
endowment theory discussed in Chapter 2.' In addition to the mineral 
raw material, inputs include labor, energy, technology and capital. As 
was also mentioned in Chapter 2. most inputs are mobile; however, 
mobility is rarely cost-free. The labor input required for most mineral 
processing operations is small. Energy on the other hand represents a 
large part of the  cost of most processing operations. While coal and 
petroleum are easily transported, hydroelectric power is much less 
mobile. Technology is frequently embodied in the  capital input. Tech- 
'Elton (1983) is the draft of the second chapter of the larger study of which this working pa- 
per is a part. 
nology was once solely the possession of multinational mining com- 
panies; however, this is no longer true (Radetzki, 19828 and UNCTAD 
1978). Technology can be purchased and the necessary amounts of capi- 
tal have become so large that frequently even the multinational mining 
companies engage in debt financing and joint venture. 
The availability of capital affects the choice of location in yet 
another way. Larger absolute amounts of capital are required for a 
greenfield facility than for the expansion of an existing, or brownfield 
facility. Furthermore, the  capital cost per unit of output is frequently 
lower for the brownfield facility. The costs of production from any incre- 
mental capacity must compare favorably with those from existing facili- 
ties, whose capital costs may be already partially or fully amortized. 
Since "sunk costs are s u n k ,  existing facilities will continue in operation 
when price does not cover total costs so long as variable costs are 
covered. As a result, the capital investment involved prevents the pro- 
cessing location from changing quickly especially when overcapacity 
exists or little growth in demand is expected. In that  case, further 
investment in processing is not financially attractive. 
Related to  input availability is the need to amass a sufficient quan- 
tity of inputs to operate a facility of the  minimum efficient scale (MES). 
Otherwise, the firms must choose between building a smaller, less effi- 
cient plant or operating a MES facility a t  less than the optimal capacity. 
Economies of scale determine how significant the  cost disadvantage is 
for the small producer. Where a range of technological choice exists, the 
impact of a smaller scale operation may be very slight. In addition, a 
cost disadvantage due to smaller scale may be counteracted by a cost 
savings arising from some other characteristic of the location. 
Transportation costs encompass both the costs of assembling the 
inputs and the costs of delivering the output to market. The declining 
trend in transportation costs, that began long before the period covered 
by this study, continued to exert considerable influence over the market 
scope for minerals during the 1950s and 1960s. Iron ore from South 
America can successfully compete in the  mid-western region of the 
United States with domestically produced iron ore, basically because the  
higher grade of the foreign ores is more than sufficient to compensate 
for the higher transport costs incurred. Over the past decade the rise in 
energy prices, specifically bunker fuel, has temporarily arrested the 
downward trend in shipping costs. 
In minerals processing, significant weight reductions frequently 
take place, resulting in some transport cost savings. For example. 
smelting a ton of copper concentrate with a 28 percent Cu content to 
produce blister with a 98 percent Cu content results in a weight reduc- 
tion of more than 70 percent. In contrast, the weight reduction from 
refining the  blister copper to a 99.99 percent level of purity i s  quite 
small. Over the period a relatively greater decline in shipping costs has 
occurred for the bulk commodities. such as iron ore and bauxite. A 
result is that processing a t  distances from the mine has become rela- 
tively more economical. The greater  decline in bulk shipping costs may 
be attributed to improved economies in loading and handling procedures. 
and to the use of larger vessels. This turn  of events further frustrates 
the  developing countries in their desire t o  increase domestic processing 
and has resulted in allegations of monopolization in the  shipping 
industry and discrimination against developing countries (UNCTAD, 
1901A). Counter arguments include the rationale that shipping costs are 
higher for processed goods because processed goods are of higher value 
and shipping costs represent a smaller proportion of that value. Hence 
the price elasticity of demand for transport is likely to be lower for pro- 
cessed goods than for unprocessed goods.2 While the general trend in 
shipping costs has aided the mineral exporting countries, the relatively 
greater decline in bulk shipping costs may discourage further processing 
near the mine in favor of processing near consuming centers. 
The final economic factor is the role that  marketing plays in the 
location of processing. Marketing skills could be viewed simply as 
another input, a specialized type of skilled labor. The reason for treating 
this separately here is to focus attention on the structural characteris- 
tics of the market that can affect the location of processing. For exam- 
ple, does an arm's-length market exist for the product a t  the proposed 
stage of processing, or is this market foreclosed due to  vertical integra- 
tion or long-term contracts? Some mineral industries exhibit a high 
degree of vertical integration. While this factor alone need not be a bar- 
rier to entry. it  may require that a new producer integrate forward more 
than one stage of the  processing chain, thereby raising the capital costs 
and generally complicating the investment decision. Allegations of res- 
trictive business practices have arisen due to  a high degree of vertical 
integration. For example, the vertically integrated firm can set transfer 
prices with the  objective of minimizing tax liability rather than 
%or further, though still inconclusive, discussion the interested reader is referred to UNI- 
DO, 1981, UNCTAD l 9 8 l A  and 18818. 
representing the true market value. A nonintegrated firm would be 
unable to compete at the transfer price. 
Long-term contracts have arisen as an alternative to vertical 
integration as a way of guaranteeing a steady supply of inputs, and in 
response to the need to raise very large amounts of capital from diverse 
sources. In both ways, long-term contracts seek to reduce or transfer 
some of the commercial risk. Long-term contracts need not bias the 
location of processing if they merely act to bring together buyers and 
sellers in the market. Nevertheless, where long-term contracts are 
widespread, the remaining market may be so thin that its clearing price 
is unrepresentative of the market as a whole. In addition, the duration of 
long-term contracts limits the flexibility of a firm attempting to enter a 
downstream processing activity either because their output is already 
committed or because potential customers are. Some flexibility remains, 
however, because long-term contracts do not customarily cover 100 per- 
cent  of the firm's requirements. 
Three further factors influence the marketing aspect of location: 
domestic demand, byproducts, and growth in the industry. The existence 
of a domestic market facilitates domestic processing because of poten- 
tial savings in transportation costs and an  ability to respond more 
quickly to  changes in the market. A number of factors considered above, 
economies of scale, transportation costs, and a domestic market also 
apply to  byproducts. The revenue from sales of byproducts encourages a 
processing location close to  consuming centers if no market exists a t  
alternative locations and if transportation costs are prohibitive. Finally. 
when the industry experiences a period of growth all the problems 
associated with marketing are diminished, whereas a period of stagna- 
tion exacerbates these problems. 
Political Determinants 
Government policies to encourage domestic industry are not 
uncommon, and in the minerals industries politics can sometimes play a 
more important role than economics. Justification for government 
intervention ranges from the necessity to correct a market imperfec- 
tion, to the argument that  economic efficiency is less important than 
other objectives, such as income redistribution, employment, or national 
pride. For example, tariffs can be used simply to protect domestic indus- 
try or to compensate for unfair trade practices. In some countries tariff 
rates on raw materials are zero or very low, and tariffs for processed 
materials escalate with the degree of processing. In this case, the effec- 
tive ra te  of protection afforded the domestic processing industry is 
higher than the nominal rate; and conversely, the barrier faced by the 
exporter is higher. Exporting countries can retaliate by enacting export 
duties on unprocessed materials. These duties seek to neutralize the 
disadvantage of exporting processed goods. Other facets of the tax sys- 
tem in addition to  tariffs are used to encourage domestic processing. 
Governments subsidize uneconomic capacity in  a variety of ways. 
including low cost energy or low-interest loans. Motivations include 
regional development objectives, national security or the need to 
preserve jobs. Some countries, such as Japan, have adopted a series of 
policies to permit large processing industries to flourish while dependent 
on imported materials. 
Not all government policies favor domestic processing. Environ- 
mental regulations are especially onerous for the minerals processing 
industry. An alternative to compliance with :domestic environmental 
regulations is to  move the activity abroad. In this manner,  developed 
countries can pursue the  option of exporting their most polluting 
mineral processing activities (Radetzki. 1982A). 
Over the period of the  study, many developing countries have 
become politically independent and have developed t h e  political infras- 
t ructure necessary to  exercise a large amount of control over their 
domestic economy in general and over foreign investment in particular. 
Along t h e  way, some countries, in which t h e  minerals sector played a 
major economic role, nationalized mineral operations owned by multina- 
tional mining companies. The nationalizations and the  increasing 
sophistication of the  developing countries in pursuing their  economic 
and political objectives have changed the rules of the game for the  tradi- 
tional investor in  the  minerals industry. The result  is greater  uncer- 
tainty and higher perceived risk that  may influence the  choice of loca- 
tion for processing. 
Historical Legacy 
A review of t h e  historical pat tern of processing aids our understand- 
ing of t h e  cu r ren t  situation and  underscores the fact tha t  the situation 
is not  static.  A t  one time, mining, processing and consumption took 
place in close geographic proximity. It was natural t o  first explore close 
to home. Furthermore, transportation costs encouraged processing and 
consumption near  the location of the natural resource. Over time the 
exhaustion of local deposits led to exploration further afield. While min- 
ing in unfamiliar locales was accepted as an undeniable necessity, the 
need to relocate processing facilities was not always apparent. The use- 
ful life of the established processing capacity frequently exceeded the 
mine life. In the event that new capacity was required, locations close to 
home were favored for two reasons: the ability to exercise control more 
easily, and the desire to minimize political risk. The shifts in processing 
came more slowly than those in mining. 
Over time, a country's minerals industry is likely to pass through 
several stages. Observations of this behavior in Europe led D.F. Hewett to 
hypothesize a general rule in 1929. Depicted in Figure 1, this model 
predicts five stages tha t  a nation experiences in regard to a mineral 
industry. In the first stage mine output is exported. As the number of 
mines increase in stage two, a smelting industry takes root (stage three) 
and ore exports drop off. The fourth stage represents the  pattern of 
metal production. As mine output declines due to  exhaustion, imported 
ore provides the feed for domestic smelters (stage five). Hewett warns 
that the order of stages need not be invariable over a wide range of his- 
tory, and that t h e  successive relation of the peaks is more important 
than the relative heights of the  curves. The model is particularly appli- 
cable to countries with domestic fuel supplies and the endurance of 
smelting capacity after mine exhaustion "depends upon the local fuel 
and power supplies and the  maintenance of competitive technique" 
(Hewett, 1929, p. 90). 
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A simplified interpretation of the Hewett model for our purposes 
would stress two stages. After mining begins, a period of ore exports is 
common due to a delay in building processing facilities. Upon exhaus- 
tion of the  mines, a period of ore imports is common due to the contin- 
ued viability of the  processing industry. The model is based primarily on 
behavior observed in Europe, and covers a time frame of an order of 
magnitude of 100 to 200 years. Hewett provides some evidence from U.S. 
behavior, reminding us that  ore from many early copper, zinc, man- 
ganese, and iron deposits traveled to Europe for treatment. although 
"the period of export of our crude minerals has been uniformly brier' 
(1929, p. 90). The model does not indicate how much time the cycle 
requires or what influences the  amount of time. The model is perhaps 
more useful for explaining the colonial pattern of resource exploitation 
than the more recent period of increasing importance of developing 
country mineral producers and their political and economic indepen- 
dence. In spite of its shortcomings, the dynamic element of the model 
provides a valuable contribution. 
Before turning from the topic of historical legacy, a reiteration of 
the comment made above in regard to capital is appropriate. Since capi- 
tal costs are frequently lower for a brownfield expansion than for a 
greenfield facility, expansions .at existing locations may be more advan- 
tageous than greenfield developments. Thus, the past location of 
minerals processing is important because of its ability to exert a con- 
tinuing influence on the location of new capacity. 
How relevant are these theories to explaining the patterns and 
trends we have identified for the processing of aluminum, copper. iron. 
nickel, tin, and zinc? I t  is to this question that  we now turn. 
ALumina. We have seen a growing percentage of alumina production 
by developing countries and by major bauxite producers. The evidence 
indicates that  bauxite availability is becoming a more important cri- 
terion for the  location of alumina production. However, bauxite 
represents only 30 percent of the value-added for alumina3 The availa- 
bility of other inputs, particularly capital and energy, are also very 
important. The capital requirement is large due to  the scale of 
'~alculation based on data in UNCTAD, 1982 using 1980 prices. 
production. Banks (1979) estimates that the smallest possible plant for 
producing alumina should have a capacity of 300,000 tpy and that capital 
costs represent about 40 percent of total production costs. Transporta- 
tion cost savings represent another incentive for processing near the 
mine. Conversion to alumina reduces the weight by approximately half, 
and the ease of handling and shipping of alumina is comparable to baux- 
ite. Alcan built the first refinery in the Caribbean because its refineries 
in Canada were a t  a greater distance from the mines and thus a t  a disad- 
vantage, relative to U.S. producers. Over the period, a number of new 
producers have entered the market, frequently via joint ventures, 
thereby reducing the degree of vertical integration in the industry. 
Long-term contracts are common and help to provide supply security for 
the non-integrated firm. The International Bauxite Association reports 
that over 80 percent of internationally-traded bauxite and alumina 
involves inter-affiliate transfers or long term contracts (Rodrik, 1980). 
Political influence in the alumina industry has taken many forms. 
Early refining capacity in the U.S. was encouraged for security reasons 
because during World War I1 shipments of bauxite were vulnerable to  
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enemy at tack The cold war mentality engendered the attitude that it  
was more desirable to ship the low-value bauxite than to risk losing the 
higher-value alumina (Girvan. 1978 and Davis. 1982). As a result. both 
Reynolds and Kaiser expanded their alumina production capacity in the 
U.S. in the 1950s despite evidence that  i t  would have been more econorni- 
cal to  build new plants next to their mines in the Caribbean (Girvan, 
'During 1842 and early 1943, 28 ships transporting bauxite were sunk out of a total 815 sail- 
ings between Sllrinam and the U.9.A. (Daviu, 1982). 
1976). Of more recent significance is the increase in the bauxite levy 
from $2.50 to $11.50 per ton, enacted by Jamaica in 1974, and adopted by 
a number of other producers. Auty's (1983) analysis For the late 1970s 
concludes that the bauxite. levy rendered a greenfield refinery in 
Jamaica so high-cost that  even without Further taxation of profits such a 
plant would be 15 percent more expensive to operate than a greenfield 
unit in Western ~ustral ia. '  Nationalization in the bauxite industry per- 
mitted developing country governments to exercise more control over 
the building of alumina facilities. The risk of nationalization and the 
increased uncertainty about taxation have undoubtedly influenced the 
investment decisions of the private aluminum companies; however, the  
magnitude of the  impact remains unquantifiable and subject to specula- 
tion. 
The aluminum industry has exhibited higher rates of growth than 
any other metal under consideration. This factor has contributed to the 
development of new alumina capacity and a shift toward more competi- 
tive locations. While bauxite availability is an important factor for 
alumina processing locations, the availability of capital and energy have 
also been shown to  be influential. Political factors have played an impor- 
tant role, especially as they contribute to the perceived political risk of 
competing locations. From a position of virtual insignificance in 1960, 
Australia has risen to the world's largest alumina producer, producing 
over 20 percent of the world's output in 1980. Australia combines the 
'.Jamaica seems to have recognized this result and announced the objective of restoring 
Jamaica as a "priority area in the aluminum companies"' investment plans, during negotia- 
tions for the extension of the agreement effective January 1904. See Mat41 Wcllrtin, De- 
cember SO, 1883, p. 9. 
attributes of bauxite availability, large domestic energy reserves, and a 
well-developed capital market,  while maintaining a political system tha t  
appears to be acceptable to  many multinational mining companies. 
Aluminum. In contrast to  alumina, aluminum exhibits a decline in 
the  amount produced within developing countries or by major bauxite 
producers. In fact, the ratios for aluminum production are the  lowest of 
t he  eight commodities under review. Clearly, bauxite availability is less 
influential t han  other  factors and this i s  not  surprising, given tha t  baux- 
i te  represents only 6 percent of the  value-added for aluminum (UNCTAD, 
1982). Energy is a considerably larger portion of the value-added. Peck 
(1983) estimates energy costs a t  U.S. smelters  in  1982 ranged from 3.2 to  
26.8 cents per pound of aluminum, with a weighted average of 16.8 cents. 
Furthermore, he found tha t  the  cost of electric power is a critical deter- 
minant  of the location decision because its price varies more by location 
than  the costs of the  other  inputs. Hence, t he  energy cost savings a t  the 
most  advantageous location more t h a n  compensates for t h e  additional 
costs  incurred by a less than optimal location for the  other inputs. One 
reason for large energy cost differentials is tha t  electric power can not 
be transmitted long distances economically. Energy availability, more 
so  than  economies of scale, is largely responsible for t h e  ultimate size of 
a smelter  (Peck, 1983). While the  weight reduction in the conversion of 
alumina into aluminum is  approximately half, the transport cost savings 
i s  less than tha t  because aluminum ingots a re  more expensive to t ran-  
sport  on a per ton basis than alumina. Some evidence exists t h a t  market  
access influenced the  processing location. In the  1960s, the  major North 
American producers began to  invest in aluminum smelters  in Western 
Europe because demand there was growing rapidly. At the same time. 
European producers began to build smelters in the U.S. (World Bank, 
1983). Peck (1983) distinguishes between two types of smelters built 
abroad by U.S. firms. The first were those designed to serve the U.S. 
market and these locations offered low-cost, hydroelectric power. The 
second type were built to serve regional markets; for this second type, 
energy costs appear to be a secondary consideration. Since the North 
American producers were able to develop smelters abroad and export 
aluminum into the U.S. market, it appears reasonable that European 
companies could have pursued the same option. Therefore, the desire of 
European companies to establish capacity within the U.S. rather than 
simply export to the U.S. would indicate that market proximity was con- 
sidered important. The location of aluminum production in 1980 is more 
closely aligned with consumption than with the production of bauxite or 
alumina. 
Due to its defense industry applications aluminum is a strategic 
mineral and thus subject to a large degree of political attention. For 
example, during World War I1 the U.S. government built nine smelters 
and sold them below cost to private firms after the war. The Canadian 
industry also received support during the war from various governmen- 
tal sources. In 1950, the U.S. and Canada together accounted for more 
than two-thirds of world aluminum production. More recently, govern- 
ment  subsidy has taken the form of low-cost energy. For example, From 
the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s electricity rates paid by aluminum 
smelters to the BonneGlle Power Administration were about one-fifth of 
the rate available to other large consumers (World Bank, 1983). While an 
incentive certainly exists for aluminum smelters to locate near low-cost 
power, the presence of the low-cost energy may reflect either a t rue sav- 
ings or a political 'decision to subsidize the industry. In the event of the 
latter,  the buyer must  be convinced that the long term c o m r n i t m e ~ t  is a 
secure one before the large amount of capital will be committed. Thus 
the search for low-cost energy is influenced by political factors, and 
therefore by political risk. Another political factor is the  use of tariffs. 
The EEC and Japan have ad valorem tariff rates on aluminum ingot of six 
and nine percent, respectively. While lower or zero rates are available to  
some developing countries under the generalized system of preferences, 
these tariffs can still present an obstacle to developing country efforts to 
export aluminum. 
The impact of the historical legacy on the current location of alumi- 
num processing is mitigated by the fact that, of all the metals under 
study, aluminum has had the shortest commercial existence and the 
highest growth rate. The high growth rate has led to significant expan- 
sions in capacity, permitting the industry to adopt more competitive 
locations. The application of the  Hewett model is hindered slightly by 
the youthfulness of the industry: no country, with the possible exception 
of France, has yet progressed through the five cycles. Nevertheless, the 
evidence thus far suggests tha t  only those bauxite producers tha t  are 
also well-endowed with energy are  likely to develop a smelting industry, 
thereby progressing to stage 3 of the model. 
BZister Copper. In contrast t o  the aluminum industry, developing 
countries and major ore producers have historically accounted for a 
large proportion of blister copper production; however, over the last 
decade a downward trend has appeared. This indicates that mine produc- 
tion is a fairly important determinant of smelter location, although its 
importance may be diminishing. A further contrast with the aluminum 
industry is the high portion of vaiue-added that accrues a t  the mining 
stage, estimated a t  over 75 percent based on 1977 values (~ i r th i s ingha ,  
1902). The majority of the copper that is exported before smelting comes 
from the Pacific rim, including Canada, Australia, the Philippines, and 
Papua New Guinea. Much of this mine production is of a fairly recent vin- 
tage and located convenient to port facilities. For example, the Bougain- 
ville mine of Papua New Guinea opened in 1973 and ships concentrates to 
Japan and Europe under long term contracts. These contracts constitute 
part of the financial package that was required to develop the project. In 
the past much of the concentrate production of the Philippines has been 
smelted in Japan; however. the Philippines brought a smelter-refinery 
complex on stream in late-1903. Much of the concentrates previously 
exported to Japan will be processed domestically and Japan will import 
refined copper instead. The Philippines have found it necessary to offer a 
slight discount in order to at tract  buyers, presumably due to  its rela- 
tively unknown reputation as a supplier. 
Smelting of the majority of Canadian ores takes place domestically; 
however, a downward trend has developed since the late 1960s as mine 
output in British Columbia has grown. Output from the initial mines was 
too small to warrant building a smelter. The lack of a local market for 
the byproduct sulfuric acid further  hindered the development of a local 
smelting industry. Transportation costs to smelters in Manitoba or 
eastern Canada proved to be high relative to ocean transport to  smelters 
in Japan. Furthermore, Japanese smelters offered very competitive 
terms under long term contracts, such that  when the mine output in 
British Columbia grew to a size sufficient to support a local smelting 
industry, the mining companies continued to find i t  advantageous to 
export concentrates to Japan ra ther  than invest in smelting capacity 
(Wittur, 1974). In fact for much of the  1970s the  "sellers" market that  
existed for concentrates discouraged most new investment in smelting 
capacity in Canada (Wittur 1974, Balogh, 1978). 
Transportation costs have also influenced the smelting location for 
African and South American concentrates. Zaire and Zambia have always 
smelted their concentrates before exporting. The mines in both Zaire 
and Zambia are located far from ports and overland transportation facili- 
ties are limited. The economies of transporting bulk concentrates by 
rail, relative to metal ingot, are less substantial than in ocean shipping 
(Wittur. 1974). The saving in transport costs due to the weight reduction 
from smelting compensates for the fact that much of the materials for 
the smelting process must be brought into the remote areas. Mine pro- 
duction in Chile and Peru is invariably within access of port facilities. As 
a result i t  is economical to export concentrates, however, in 1980 both 
countries were smelting almost 90 percent of their concentrates. 
The only countries that have major smelting industries without sig- 
nificant mine output are Japan and, on a much smaller scale, the  
Federal Republic of Germany. Japanese blister copper production ranks 
as the world's fourth largest. Reasons for Japan's position appear to be 
influenced by political objectives, and import restrictions on blister have 
subsidized domestic smelters by supporting a domestic price in excess of 
t he  wdrld price (Balogh, 1978 and Whitney, 1976). In addition, both coun- 
t r i e s  have markets  for the byproduct sulfur. 
Another concern of the political system, environmental quality, 
affects the  copper industry most  seriously a t  the smelting stage. This is 
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due to  the  separation of the  copper from sulfur and other impurities t ha t  
takes place during smelting. Environmental regulations in many 
developed countries call for reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions, often 
necessitating a large capital investment. In 1980 and 1970 the U.S. 
smelted less concentrates  than it produced, reversing the pat tern exhi- 
bited in 1960 and 1950. Furthermore, a smaller absolute amount  of 
copper was smelted in t h e  U.S. in 1980 than  in 1970. Could this situation 
be t h e  resul t  of environmental regulations? Whitney's (1976) analysis 
covering the  period up  t o  1972 concluded tha t  environmental problems 
were not  a determinant  of smelter  locations; however, the impact  of 
environmental problems and t h e  attention they have received have mul- 
tiplied since 1972. Environmental concern provides a possible interpre- 
tation of the  Japanese contribution to t h e  rise of the Philippine smelting 
industry. Japanese firms provided both technical expertise and  financ- 
ing assistance. Japan has also contracted t o  buy considerable amounts  
of t h e  output,  a t  the same t ime tha t  the  Japanese smelting industry is 
operating well below capacity. This pat tern of behavior would be con- 
s is tent  with t h e  goal of exporting polluting activities to protect t he  
domestic environment. 
The behavior of t he  copper smelting industry provides some support 
t o  the  Hewett model. New mining areas,  such as those in British Colum- 
bia, Australia, Papua New Guinea, and  the Philippines, exhibit a pat tern 
of export-orientation prior to developing a local processing industry. The 
period will be prolonged, as it was for mines in British Columbia, if oppor- 
tunities to sell concentrate are  more economically attractive than 
investment in new capacity. 
In summary, most concentrates are smelted near the mine to 
economize on transportation costs. Where smelting occurs a t  long dis- 
tances from the mines, primarily in Japan and the  F.R.G., these smelters 
tend to be mhket-oriented and revenues from the byproduct sulfur help 
to offset the  cost disadvantage incurred in transport. Import restric- 
tions further aided the viability of the  Japanese smelting industry. 
Aefined Copper. The location of copper refining has historically been 
somewhat more market-oriented than smelting, although the share pro- 
cessed by developing countries has increased over the period. The share 
of copper refined by the major ore producers has remained fairly steady. 
In addition to Japan and the F.R.G., who have smelting industries, Bel- 
gium and the United Kingdom constitute the countries with substantial 
refined copper production without substantial domestic mine produc- 
tion. Their comparative advantage appears to be their location near 
large industrial markets. The availability of copper scrap may also be 
advantageous, though this can not be considered a major determinant. 
The weight reduction between smelting and refining is not large 
enough to  generate transportation cost savings, nor does the transfor- 
mation from blister to refined copper result in significant differences in 
handling or loading. Historically refineries have often been located a t  
the point where the mode of shipment changes, to economize on han- 
dling costs, such a s  packaging and terminal charges (Whitney, 1976). 
Economies of scale tend to be larger for refineries than for 
smelters, partly due to the economies of by-product recovery. Blister 
copper frequently contains significant amounts of gold, silver, or lesser 
byproducts. Refining separates these metals from the copper and some 
amount of additional processing is required for each byproduct to be in a 
marketable form. Economies of scale in the byproduct recovery circuits 
can influence the  economically-efficient size of the overall refinery. The 
increasing complexity from multi-product recovery requires greater 
technical expertise and skilled labor. Since there are fewer refineries 
than smelters, a refinery frequently depends upon blister copper from 
more than one source (Whitney, 1976). Hence, locations within a well- 
developed transportation network are advantageous. The output of the 
refinery involves a variety of products, including the byproduct metals 
plus the copper in  several shapes such as  cathodes, wirebars, billets and 
alloys, that  may require special handling and packaging. A savings in 
handling and packaging costs can arise if t he  refinery is near semi- 
fabricating plants. While each factor alone may appear inconsequential, 
the combined effect is a slight advantage to  locating refineries near 
markets. 
Fron. The downward t r end  in the amount of iron ore processed 
domestically, which was slightly less than 50 percent in 1980, is evidence 
of the declining pull exerted by the  location of inputs. In the nineteenth 
century, when u p  t o  eight tons of coking coal were required to produce 
one ton of pig iron, the iron making industry located most efficiently in 
areas where iron ore and coking coal were found in close proximity 
(Manners, 1971). Industries dependent on iron and steel tended to locate 
close to the mills (Manners, 1971). Improved iron making techniques 
have reduced both the iron ore and coking coal requirements signifi- 
cantly, and in conjunction with transportation economies, have enabled 
the industry to become more market oriented. Changes in steel making 
technology have also led to a more important role for scrap, as both a 
substitute and a complement for pig iron. Therefore, proximity to con- 
suming centers is advantageous for facilitating scrap collection. 
Over the period of the study, significant reductions in transport 
costs for bulk commodities, which includes both iron ore and coal, have 
occurred. The 10-20,000 ton ore carriers of the 1950s have been dis- 
placed by carriers as large as 150,000 tons (Santos, 1976). In 1950 the 
cost per ton of ore for transportation from Brazil to Japan was about $20; 
by 1965 the rate was as low as $4 (current dollars) (Santos, 1976). While 
one example serves to document the magnitude of the cost reductions, i t  
should be kept in mind that  shipping rates vary considerably by specific 
route and Length of journey, frequency, port charges, and a myriad of 
other factors. The ne t  effect of transport costs on the processing loca- 
tion must also account for the  transport of other inputs, such as coal. 
and the transport of the output. While stressing the complexity of the 
countervailing forces, Manners (1971) concludes that  the  net  affect 
favors a market orientation. The result is due in part to  the fact tha t  the 
output is not a bulk commodity and its distribution involves a larger 
number of buyers. Most iron ore and coal exporters are dependent upon 
one or two major importers (UNCTAD, 1981A), while the trade in finished 
steel mill products is more diffused. 
While economiits of scale have become larger for conventional iron 
and steel making processes over the period, some new technologies have 
enabled efficient production a t  smaller scale. These new technologies 
include direct reduction for iron production, the electric arc  furnace for 
steel production, and the  continuous caster for semi-finished products. 
The conventional process for making steel begins with the production of 
pig iron in a blast furnace. The blast furnace requires a large amount of 
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capital and is efficient only for large-tonnage production. An alterna- 
tive to the blast furnace is the  direct reduction process, which results in 
a product called sponge iron, and is especially appropriate for locations 
where natural gas or  other suitable fuels are abundant. About 85 percent 
of the  sponge iron produced is converted to  steel in captive or associated 
electric arc  furnaces (World Bank, 1982). These technologies are  espe- 
cially appropriate for developing countries with small markets. 
Countries tha t  desire to  produce iron in excess of their domestic 
requirements encounter serious problems due to the high degree of vert- 
ical integration in the iron and steel industry. This vertical integration 
results from economies in the  use of heat  and energy, the movement of 
scrap, and the ease of management (Manners, 1971). For example. pig 
iron is often transferred from the  blast furnace to the steel furnace in 
molten form, because the  conservation of heat  from the first stage 
reduces the  energy requirements of the  next stage. The advantage of 
having the  steel furnace in close proximity is  obvious. In regard to the 
movement of scrap, an integrated operation permits the trimmings from 
'UNIDO, (1980) estimates that the capital cost for annual ton of steel capacity is $818 for 
blast furnace/basic oxygen facilities and $370 for direct reduction/electric furnece mini 
milla (1978 dollar values). 
the  mill and any poorly cast  ingots, etc. t o  be easily circulated back into 
the steel furnace. Transporting this scrap within an integrated plant is 
often cheaper than  transporting i t  between unintegrated plants. The 
third advantage of vertical integration is that  control of the entire 
operation by a single management  is likely to yield greater efficiency. 
This vertical integration is largely responsible for the lack of an interna- 
tional market  for pig iron. Therefore a country that  desires to  process i ts  
iron ore before export must integrate  forward into semi-fabricated steel 
products. The marketing of these products is significantly more difficult 
in comparison to  either iron ore, because there are a larger number of 
smaller buyers for the semis, or  nonferrous metals, such as  copper o r  
zinc, t ha t  can be easily traded on a metals exchange. 
A further  market-related problem tha t  steel exporters encounter is 
the existence of tariffs and  quotas designed to protect the domestic steel 
industry in many developed countries.  The fact t ha t  international agree- 
ments  now in effect are reducing tariffs in steps between 1980 and 1987, 
does not appear to  be attenuating the  use of quotas, especially during 
the  recent  period of overcapacity (U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1983). Trade 
restrictions reflect in part  t h e  willingness of developed country govern- 
men t s  t o  subsidize inefficient production in an effort t o  avoid the  social 
problems of relocation in the  industry. Many countries have used their 
steel industry a s  a tool for achieving regional development objectives. 
This is a s  t rue  for the developed countries a s  for the developing coun- 
tries, and also explains some of t h e  investments made by the Soviet 
Union (Manners, 1971). Based partly on the success of the developed 
countries' regional development policies, some developing countries, 
such as Venezuela, have chosen the steel industry a s  a springboard for 
resource-based industrialization. Pollution control in developed coun- 
tries may work to encourage relocation towards the developing world 
where environmental regulations are not as strict .  For the U.S. iron and  
steel industry the  estimated investment in pollution control was $400 
million per  annum, over the 1972 to 1981 period, and  the  task is far from 
complete (U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1983). 
During the  recent  period of over capacity, some industry specialists 
have begun to anticipate a permanent  slowdown in t h e  growth of demand 
for steel in the  developed countries. Over the  period 1970 to  1980 pig 
iron production in developed countries registered no growth, while the  
developing countries output increased from 18.3 to 43.3 million tons, an 
increase of over 200 percent.  Although the  developed and socialist coun- 
tries will continue to dominate the  world iron and steel industry for the  
foreseeable future based on their current  capacities, growth in the  
developing countries' output  may continue to  exceed that  in the  
developed countries a s  technology favors smaller scale operations and 
permits the  developing world to  service their domestic markets.  
While an  integrated steel industry may be beyond the  reach of many  
developing countries, agglomeration provides an opportunity for ore 
exporting countr ies  to share in a bit more of the value-added. 
Agglomeration of low grade ores is an intermediary stage between iron 
ore and pig iron, that  is common in the developed countries. The pro- 
cess, which was first proven economical in  the  United States in the 
1950s, has  spread to the point where almost 100 percent  of ore produced 
in the  developed countries is agglomerated. The comparable figure for 
the developing countries, however, was only 22 percent in 1979, despite 
the fact that  it can have a significant value-added impact.7 Agglomera- 
tion is essential for ores with an iron content  of less than 50 percent.  
The fact that  ores from most developing countries are  of a higher iron 
content  helps to explain the low share of ores agglomerated by develop 
ing countries. Two agglomeration processes are  commercial, sintering 
and  pelletization. Sintering results in  a product that  deteriorates with 
travel. In addition, i ts production uses coke breeze, which is a byproduct 
of metallurgical coal: therefore, sintering usually takes place near  the  
blast furnace. For example, Japan sinters  t he  ore tha t  i t  imports from 
Australia and Peru. Pelletization requires energy and manufacturing- 
like equipment and technology tha t  the  developing countries may find 
prohibitive. 
In applying the  Hewett model to  t h e  iron and steel industry, we see 
tha t  many developed country steel industries have become dependent on 
iron ore imports due to  a decline in local ore production. However, over 
the period of this study, the  lack of domestic ore  supplies has  not con- 
s t rained the  development of steel industries in those developed coun- 
tries without domestic ore production, such as  Japan. Furthermore, 
some large iron ore producers have failed to develop, or  have only 
recently begun to develop, processing industries commensurate  with 
the i r  iron ore production capability. The size of domestic markets  has 
undoubtedly' constrained the  development of an iron a n d  steel industry 
in  these countries. The relatively recent  development of technologies 
'UNCTAD data from 1969 to  1977 show that pellets were sold at  an average price premium of 
33 percent (in real terms) relative to lump ore of the same iron content from the same prc- 
ducer (1878). 
permitting efficient operation a t  smaller scales has permitted some 
developing country ore producers to begin iron and steel production. 
Nickel. All the major nickel ore producing countries have processing 
capability. Since 1950 a fairly consistent 60 percent of ores have been 
processed domestically. The role of developing countries in processing 
has increased significantly, due primarily to a shift in the relative impor- 
tance of lateritic ores. There are two major types of nickel ores: sulfide 
ore and oxide or lateritic ore. Lateritic ores are found primarily in tropi- 
cal climates; hence, production from developing countries tends to be 
from lateritic ores. Due to the  fine dissemination of nickel in the ore, 
lateritic ores are not economical to concentrate in the manner of sulfide 
ores. Instead, lateritic ores are  smelted without concentration and the 
end product is ferronickel, a product used directly by the steel industry. 
In fact, changes in steelmaking technology over the period have ren- 
dered ferronickel more acceptable to the steel industry relative to 
refined nickel. Transport cost savings encourage processing near the 
mine for both sulfide and lateritic ores; however, the infeasibility of con- 
centrating lateritic ores makes the  transport cost savings relatively 
greater. As a result of the rise in the share of nickel from lateritic ores, 
more processing is taking place near the lateritic mines, and therefore, 
more processing is taking place in developing countries. For Canada, the 
major producer of sulfide ores, the  combined availability of ore produc- 
tion and the  other factor inputs, in particular hydroelectric power, and a 
domestic steel industry explain i ts  prominent role in processing. 
The major factors responsible €or the 35 to 40 percent of the ore not 
processed domestically are government policy and the historical legacy. 
In 1970 and 1980 Japan was the world's third largest refined nickel pro- 
ducer,  accounting for 15 percent of world production, in spite of the lack 
of domestic resources. Japan committed itself t o  the  development of a 
local processing industry and achieved its objective by securing supplies 
of the raw material and enacting tariffs to protect the industry from 
lower-cost, foreign competition (Hubbard, 1975). In 1965 Inco's desire to 
break into the Japanese market resulted in i ts  becoming a partner  in  a 
joint venture with two Japanese companies. The new refining company, 
the Tokyo Nickel Company, relies upon raw materials supplied by Inco. 
Historical legacy helps to explain the relative position of Norway and the 
United Kingdom. In 1928, the International Nickel Company (INCO) 
acquired the Mond Nickel Company of Great Britain, thereby acquiring a 
nickel refinery in Wales that  is still in operation. When incorporated in 
Canada in 1928, Falconbridge already owned a refinery in Norway and has 
over the years expanded and modernized the refinery to keep pace with 
its Canadian mining and smelting operations. These refineries exemplify 
the ability of the processing industry to remain viable long after the  
local mines have been exhausted. While the  relative importance of Nor- 
way and the United Kingdom has clearly declined over the period, their 
continued importance testifies t o  the tenacity of the historical legacy in 
the processing industry. 
Tin. Over the period of the study, developing countries have pro- 
gressed from smelting less than half of their tin ores in 1950 to over 90 
percent today. Malaysia, t he  largest producer over the ent ire  period, 
smelts all its domestic concentrates in addition to a substantial, though 
declining, amount of imports. The early Malaysian smelting industry was 
built with British capital. The necessary technology for smelting the 
type of ore found in Southeast Asia is not too complex and appears to 
have been readily available commercially. The availability of technology 
partly reflects the  lack of vertical integration in the industry. The avai- 
lability of other inputs varies by country. Thoburn (1981) concludes that  
in 1970 only 25 percent of the Malaysian mining industry's purchases of 
intermediate. products were imported, while the comparable figure for 
Bolivia was 85 percent. Hence, smelting in Bolivia is less economically 
attractive and in 1980 only half i ts concentrates were processed domesti- 
cally. A further  difficulty for the Bolivian industry is a harder, more 
complex ore tha t  produces a concentrate of lower tin content, more diffi- 
cult to smelt than the typical ore from southeast Asia. 
Over the  1950 to 1980 period a steady contraction of the developed 
country tin processing industry has taken place. Smelters in developed 
countries relied primarily on imported concentrates, the  supply of which 
has dried up as  developing countries have provided for more domestic 
processing. Thoburn (1981) cites the developing countries' desire to  
improve their bargaining position relative to purchasers as a major 
motivation for the  shift in processing location. The marketing of refined 
tin was not a n  obstacle due to the lack of vertical integration and the 
arm's-length markets provided in Penang, New York, and by the London 
Metal Exchange. Smelting, which represents less than 5 percent of the 
gross output value for the  tin produced in Southeast Asia, appears to  
have been a financially attractive investment (Thoburn, 1981). 
Furthermore, domestic smelting results in transport cost savings due to 
a weight reduction of approximately one-third. 
Governments have played an active part in furthering local process- 
ing. At the turn of the century, Malaysia enacted a duty on the export of 
unsmelted tin. The establishment of Thailand's smelter in 1965 by Billi- 
ton was supported by Thailand's Board of Investment with a prohibition 
on exports of unsmelted ore and a 5-year ban on the establishment of 
any additional smelting capacity (Thoburn, 1981). The U.S. smelting 
industry was built to  t rea t  imported ores for the strategic stockpile, as  
well as for current  consumption (Robertson, 1982). In the 1950s, both 
Bolivia and Indonesia nationalized the major firms in their tin indus- 
tries. Before nationalization very little smelting took place domestically. 
Since nationalization both countries have integrated forward into smelt- 
ing, with Bolivia smelting 50 percent and Indonesia 100 percent of their 
mine production in 1980. The control over the industry that  resulted 
from nationalization undoubtedly aided Bolivia and Indonesia in meeting 
their objective of increased local processing. 
In summary, local processing has proven to be economical. The 
relatively rapid shift in processing in favor of developing, producing 
countries, especially in light of the low rate of growth in the industry, is 
due in large part t o  government policy in the developing countries. 
Access t o  the  technology, availability of markets, and the lack of vertical 
integration facilitated the progress of the developing countries. 
Zinc. Sixty percent of the zinc mined is smelted domestically and 
this portion has remained fairly constant over the  last thirty years, indi- 
cating tha t  a domestic supply of concentrates is advantageous but not an 
essential criterion for a smelting industry. The U.S. decline in smelter 
output has been partially attributed to the decline in domestic mine pro- 
duction; however, the ability of the  Japanese and European industries to 
expand output during the same time period despite their dependence on 
imported concentrates, indicates that  other factors have contributed to 
the decline of the  U.S. industry. Economies of scale exhibit declining 
average costs up to a capacity of approximately 100,000 tpa (Wittur, 
1974). Increasing economies of scale have resulted in higher capital 
requirements; however, the technology has been readily available (Hill- 
man, 1977) and the  existence of smelters in so many developing coun- 
tries indicates that  the availability of technology and capital has not 
been a serious constraint. Wittur (1974) does cite a period prior to  1970 
when excess smelting capacity kept smelting charges low, hence toll 
smelting was financially more attractive for the  Canadian zinc mining 
industry than investment in local smelting capacity. In 1970 Canada was 
smelting only one-third of domestic zinc concentrates. Transportation 
costs played a fairly neutral role in the Canadian processing location. 
Rail rates to existing smelters were high relative to ocean shipping rates; 
while ocean shipping rates were cheaper per ton for concentrates than 
for metal, the savings was completely offset by the  weight reduction 
resulting from smelting (Wittur, 1974). So, advantageous smelting terms 
from abroad had a greater  influence on the decision to export concen- 
t rates  than did transport economies. Smelters close to  industrial 
centers have the  advantage of being able to market the byproduct sulfur. 
Thus smelters in Japan and Europe have been able to offer lower smelt- 
ing charges. 
The history of government assistance or intervention in the zinc 
industry is long and  colorful.' Memories O F  tight supplies during World 
War I1 led the  U.S. government to provide assistance to both foreign and 
domestic producers when the  Korean conflict began. The government 
programs provided exploration funds, development loans, and long te rm 
purchase contracts  with floor prices. Foreign countries receiving aid 
under these programs included Peru, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Mexico. At 
the same time, t h e  supply problems experienced by Switzerland led to a 
loan of 150 million Swiss francs to Belgium for the construction of a 
40,000 tpa electrolytic zinc smelter  i n  the  Belgian Congo (now Zaire). 
The U.S. government was perhaps too successful in encouraging new 
capacity and by 1958 the glut in the market resulted in the U.S. adopting 
quotas to protect the  domestic industry. This action may have actually 
encouraged foreign producers to build smelters to  process the  concen- 
t rates  that  had previously been exported to the U.S. Quotas were abol- 
ished in 1965. Japan and  the  EEC maintain tariffs on zinc metal  but not 
on concentrates, so as to benefit their  domestic smelting industries. The 
U.S. maintains tariffs on both concentrates and metal. While tariffs have 
aided the mining industry, they have hindered the smelting industry. 
The tariff s t ruc ture  of Japan and the  EEC encourages countries to  export 
concentrates to  those markets; however, the tariff s t ruc ture  of the U.S. 
is fairly neutral between concentrates and refined metal. The result is 
that  the overwhelming majority of zinc imported by the  U.S. is in the 
form of slab zinc r a the r  than  concentrates. From 1969 to  1972 approxi- 
' ~ u r  a more complete analysis, the interested reader is referred to Ilillman (1977) from 
which thi i  brief summary is taken. 
mately 30 percent of t he  U.S. zinc smelting industry was shut  down. The 
U.S. went from t h e  largest zinc producer in 1970 to fourth largest in 
1980. Closure of t he  U.S. smelters  has been linked to the potentially 
onerous impact of environmental regulations; however, Hillman (1977) 
at t r ibutes  t h e  closures to  the  inability of the  U.S. producers to  justify 
new investment, particularly in light of the age of t h e  facilities and, 
perhaps more importantly, due to the  adverse government policies of 
tariffs and price controls. The Japanese industry was able to  double its 
smelting capacity between 1965 and 1970 due in part  to  the  large subsi- 
dies it received in the forms of tariff barriers, tax relief, low interest  
loans and  direct cash g ran t s  (Hillman, 1977). In Canada, the Ontario 
government pressured Texasgulf into building a new smelter  in the  late 
1960s to t r ea t  ores from its Kidd Creek mine, by providing an $8 million 
subsidy (Hillman, 1977). 
Application of the Hewett model to the zinc industry provides con- 
flicting results. Wittur (1974) in his analysis of the  Canadian industry 
provides evidence of the lag between the  development of mine capacity 
and that  of smelting capacity. The da ta  for the  U.S., on the other  hand, 
does not  support the  Hewett model. As domestic mine production has 
declined, t he  smelting industry has declined even more dramatically. 
Instead of a viable smelting industry surviving the  closure of domestic 
mines by relying upon imports,  a n  equilibrium between mine output  and 
smelter  production has developed. The behavior pat tern conflicts with 
the expectation of a viable smelting industry surviving the  depletion of 
domestic reserves. In this  case, government policy and t h e  age of the  
smelters  were the determining factors. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter illustrates the simple fact t ha t  comparative advantage 
a t  one stage of processing does not  guarantee  comparative advantage a t  
subsequent stages. The inputs required for each production process, a s  
well a s  the  impact of public policy and the  historical legacy vary a t  dif- 
ferent stages. Furthermore, t he  determining factors differ by commo- 
dity. The perception that  too little mineral  processing takes place in 
developing countries can not be explained simply by allegations of 
discrimination on the  par t  of the developed countries or by arguments of 
the inherent  political r i skness  of some developing countries. This is not 
t o  say tha t  discrimination o r  political risk a re  irrelevant, only tha t  the 
underlying factors are  more complex. A satisfactory explanation for the 
role of developing countries in minerals  processing must  also contribute 
t o  our understanding of the role of developed country mineral producers, 
who do not process 100 percent of their  mineral output either. Further- 
more the  fact tha t  t he  share of developing countries' exports 
represented by complex, finished goods has  increased over this  period, 
indicates t h a t  specialization a t  early stages of some processing chains 
can not be explained by the  inability of developing countries to  produce 
more elaborate products (UNIDO, 1981). Rather, explanations of barriers 
t o  domestic processing a r e  the  resul t  of characteristics specific t o  each 
commodity and  each processing activity. 
For the  commodities of interest  t o  this study, determinants of the 
location of processing involve several economic and political factors tha t  
interact  with the historical legacy. For alumina processing, government 
policies among bauxite producing countries have been of primary impor- 
tance; transport cost savings and capital availability were influential, 
though of relatively less importance. In aluminum production, the avai- 
lability of low cost energy is an overriding concern, although, it should 
be noted tha t  public policy has frequently supplanted the market  in the  
pricing of energy. Transport cost savings and the market  for byproduct 
sulfur a re  the  primary determinants of the  location of copper smelters.  
Copper refineries, on the other hand are more market oriented, and tend  
to  be located a t  transshipment points. For iron ore, proximity to the 
source of inputs has  become less important due to transportation 
economies for bulk commodities as  well as a reduction in the required 
inputs per  ton of output. Technologies permitting efficient operation on 
a smaller scale have also contributed to a market orientation and have 
encouraged more iron and  steel production in developing countries. In 
the  nickel industry, the  interaction of the  technology for treating lateri-  
t ic ores and t h e  transport cost savings has been as important as  tariff 
s t ruc tures  and historical legacy. The shift toward local processing in the  
tin industry is largely attributable to  government policy whose success 
was aided by the  s t ruc ture  of t he  industry. In the zinc industry, tariffs 
and other  political interventions have helped to shape the pat tern of 
smelter locations. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Alumina Production by Country and  Country Group. 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
group metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 
Australia 
U.S. 
Japan 
F.R.G. 
France 
Canada 
Greece 
Other 
Developing 
Countries 
Jamaica 
Surinam 
Yugoslavia 
Guinea 
India 
Brazil 
Guyana 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
Hungary 
China 
Romania 
Other 
TOTAL 
Appendix Table 1 continued 
a ~ i g u r e s  may not  sum to  totals due to rounding. 
!Data  from 1955 a r e  t h e  earliest available. 
'- indicates less than  half a unit. 
S u r c e s :  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
The World Market for  B a d e :  Characteris t ics  and  Trends,  Stat is t ical  
Annez (1982) .  
Appendix Table 2 
Aluminum Production by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands P e r  
and of tans af cent of tans af cent of tons of cent  of tons of cent  
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
63-0 UP metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 
u .S. 
Japan 
Canada 
F.R.G. 
Norway 
France 
Spain 
U.K. 
Australia 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Other 
Developing 
Countries 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Ghana 
India 
Yugaslavia 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
China 
Romania 
Hungary 
Other 
TOTAL 
Appendix Table 2 cont inued 
aF'igures may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b-- indicates less than half a unit. 
SUTC~:  Metal Satis t ics  (various years). 
Appenax  Table 3 
Copper Smel te r  Product ion by Country and  Country Group, 
Se lec ted  Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
gr0 UP metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 1344 5 3 
u .S. 
Japan 
Canada 
South Africa 
Australia 
F.R.G. 
Spain 
Other 
Developing 
Countries 938 3 7 
Chile 346 14 
Zambia 28 1 11 
Zaire 172 7 
Peru 23 1 
Yugoslavia 40 2 
Mexico 56 2 
Other 20 1 
Socialist 
Countries 240 10 
U.S.S.R. 218 9 
Poland - -- 
China N A ~  N A 
Other 22 1 
TOTAL 2522 100 
Appendix Table 3 continued 
Notes :  
aFigures may not sum to  totals due to  rounding. 
b-- indicates less than half a unit. 
'NA indicates not  available. Data for China for 1950 and 1960 
are included with Other Socialist Countries. 
S u r c e :  Meta l  Satis tics (various years). 
Appendix Table 4 
Refined Copper Production by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
gro UP metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 
u .S. 
Japan 
Canada 
Belgium b 
F.R.G. 
Australia 
U.K. 
Spain 
South Africa 
Other 
Developing 
Countries 
Chile 
Zambia 
Peru 
Zaire 
Yugoslavia 
Mexico 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
Poland 
China 
Other 
TOTAL 
Appendix Table 4 cont inued 
Notes:  
al?igures may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
'~efined copper production of Luxembourg is included with the 
Belgian data for 1970 and 1980. 
'- indicates less than half a unit. 
d~~ indicates not available. Data for China for 1950 and 1960 
are included with Other Socialist Countries. 
9 u r c e :  Metal S ta t i s t i c s  (various years). 
Appendix Table 5 
Pig Iron Product ion by Country and  Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
Era UP metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 
Japan 
U.S. 
F.R.G. 
France 
Canada 
Belgium 
South Africa 
Australia 
U.K. 
Spain 
Luxembourg 
0 t her 
Developing 
Countries 
Brazil 
India 
Mexico 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
China 
Poland 
Romania 
Other 
TOTAL 
Appendix Table 5 continued 
Notes: 
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ a t a  for 1950 include ferroalloys. 
'-- indicates less than half a unit. 
Source: Manners (1971); United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, Proposed Establishment of a n  Annual Statistical 
Programme Relating t o  h o n  Ore: Statistics o n  Iron O r e  (1981). 
Appendix Table 6 
Refined Nickel Production by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
g r-0 up metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 
Canada 
Jap a c  
U.S. 
Norway 
Australia 
U.K. 
South Africa 
Greece 
Finland 
France 
Other 
Developing 
Countries -- 11 3 53 9 114 15 -- 
New Caledonia -- -- 11 3 27 5 33 4 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 3 
Cuba 0 0 0 0 18 3 20 3 
Dominican Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 2 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 5 1 15 2 
Other 0 0 0 0 3 1 7 1 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
China 
Other 
TOTAL 148 100 327 100 584 10 0 748 100 
Appendix Table 6 continued 
Notes :  
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b-- indicates less than half a unit. 
'NA indicates not available. Data for China for 1950, 1960. and 
1970 are included with Other Socialist Countries. 
Source:  Metal Statistics (various issues). 
A~K- v n d i x  Table 7 
Tin S m e l t e r  P roduc t io   b y  Country and Country Group, 
Selecte Years ,  1950-1980~ 
Thousands Per- T h a  -sands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
of tons of cent of t  n s  of cent of tons of cent  of tons of cent  
con ta ined  of co- -a i n e d  of contained of contained of 
meta l  total m e  -1 total metal total metal total 
l i a  
m b 
rlands 
sia 
md 
esia 
a 
pore 
ia 
Appendix Table 7 continued 
Notes .  
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to  rounding. 
b~roduc t ion  of Luxembourg is included with the Belgian da ta  
for 1970 and 1980. 
'-- indicates less than half a unit. 
d~~ indicates not available. Data for Nigeria for 1950 are  
included with Other Developing Countries. 
S o u r c e :  Metal S ta t i s t i c s  (various issues). 
Appendix Table 8 
Zinc Smelter  Production by Country a n d  Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands P e r  
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
group metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 
Japan 
Canada 
U.S. 
F.R.G. 
Australia 
France 
Belgium b 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Finland 
U.K. 
South Africa 
Norway 
Others 
Developing 
Countries 
Mexico 
Yugoslavia 
Brazil 
Korea, Rep.of 
Peru 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
Poland 
China 
Korea, D.P.R. 
Bulgaria 
Other 
TOTAL 
Appendix Table 8 continued 
Notes: 
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b~roduc t ion  of Luxembourg is included with the  Belgian data for 
1970 and 1980. 
'-- indicates less than half a unit. 
d~~ indicates not available. Data for Brazil for 1950 are included 
with Other Developing Countries. 
Source:  Metal S ta t i s t i c s  (various issues). 
